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A “Hoosier Comeback” program, sponsored by the Indiana Economic Development 
Corporation, is part of a strategy to boost economic growth, in this case through 
increasing the quantity and quality of available human resources.  The plan envisions 
subsidies to encourage the return of former residents. Indiana’s population growth has 
been weak relative to the rest of the country, though not as weak as in the 1970s and 80s.  
It is set to return to a much weaker pace, however, according the US Census Bureau.  In 
1972-87, Indiana’s population growth rate was only 0.2 percent per year, well below the 
US pace of one percent per year.  In some years, population even fell (1980-83 and 
1986).  Subsequently, Indiana’s population grew at a 0.8 percent average annual rate 
from 1987 to 2005, closer to, but still below, the national pace of 1.2 percent per year. 
Over the next 25 years US population growth is expected to slow (0.8 percent per year) 
and Indiana’s is expected to fall back more sharply (to 0.3 percent per year). Such slow 
growth in population and the workforce will curtail the pace of expansion of overall 
output and income in the US and all the more so in Indiana.1    
 
A broader effort could usefully focus on recruiting others to migrate to Indiana or on 
inducing existing residents to stay.  Charles Tiebout, in a famous paper published a half-
century ago, explained that consumers vote with their feet, sorting themselves into 
political jurisdictions based on their preferences for public sector goods and services.  
This “Tiebout hypothesis” has found strong statistical support in a variety of contexts 
ever since and has become a critical feature of local government expenditure and tax 
analysis.  If people vote with their feet, then governments that reduce government 
programs or raise taxes would discourage residency and economic activity in their 
jurisdictions. Indiana could attract back more former residents, or keep those it has, by 
lowering the tax burden, if people vote with their feet.  In the reverse direction, Smith 
Conway and Houtenville (2001) provide evidence that the elderly are attracted to move to 
states with sales-tax-exempt food, low personal income tax rates, low death taxes, and 
low welfare spending.  LaFaive (2006) cites evidence of large net out-migration in 
Michigan recently due to the large and rising tax burden.   
 
In-migration rates are strongly affected by state and local tax rates.  Chart 1 below shows 
the tax rate prepared by the Tax Foundation for the 50 states for 2005 and in-migration 
rates prepared by the US Bureau of the Census for 2005.2 The in-migration rate is 
measured by the number of residents over one year of age who did not live in a state in 
the prior year divided by the current population.  The tax rate includes all state and local 
taxes as a percent of net state product.  Evidence supporting consumers voting with their 
feet can be seen in the chart.  While there are many other factors that affect in-migration, 
the negative relation between the state and local tax rate and in-migration is apparent.   
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A higher tax rate lowers the in-migration rate
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The in-migration rate is very sensitive to the tax rate.3 In the linear formulation of the 
data captured by the trend line shown in the figure, each one percentage point rise in the 
tax rate will reduce the in-migration rate by 0.41 percentage points. This effect is 
statistically significant at a conventional level of significance (t-ratio equals -3.62, which 
implies that the effect is significantly different from zero at a 99.9 percent confidence 
level).  This means that there is less than one chance in a thousand that such a value 
(0.41) could occur randomly when the true value is zero, or that there is no relationship 
between tax rates and in-migration whatsoever. 
 
There are other factors that could affect the in-migration rate besides the tax rate and 
some of those could be correlated with the tax rate so that the simple linear relationship is 
really just due to those other non-tax factors.  Two such factors were added to the 
statistical relationship to check the robustness of the tax rate effect, the growth rate of 
employment in the previous year and the level of per capita personal income. Including 
either measure does not have an effect on the statistical significance of the tax effect.  Per 
capita income does not affect in-migration in these tests.  This is a potentially useful 
measure to capture non-tax effects on in-migration because it is uncorrelated with, or not 
statistically related to, the tax rate measure ( the “correlation coefficient” which measures 
such a relationship is only 0.04; this measure has a value of one if there is a perfect 
correlation and zero if there is no relationship). One might expect that out-of-state 
residents are attracted to states with higher per capita income.  Per capita personal income 
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has no effect on in-migration (its coefficient has the wrong sign and its t-ratio equals 
0.55), however. Its inclusion has essentially no effect on the size (0.40) or significance (t-
ratio is -3.53) of the tax rate effect. 
   
Including past employment growth in the analysis of in-migration along with the other 
two measures does have a systematic positive effect, as would be expected.  People are 
influenced to move into a state where employment growth has been relatively more rapid.  
The coefficient on employment growth is 0.75 and it is statistically significant (t-ratio 
equals 6.81), strongly supporting this view. The absolute size of the tax effect drops to 
 -0.27 (t-ratio equals -3.24) in this estimate.  The implication of this result is that high 
past employment growth that attracts in-migration is highly correlated with low tax rates, 
which is not surprising. The correlation coefficient, which indicates this negative 
correlation, -0.32, is relatively high for the number of observations (fifty states) here. 
Arguably, the expectation of low tax rates accounts for both effects.   
 
In Indiana, the state and local tax rate rose from 10.0 percent to 10.6 percent between 
2000 and 2005.  According to the linear relationship in the data, this tax hike would 
reduce the in-migration rate by 0.24 percentage points. This is half the decline in 
population growth for the 2005-30 period projected by the Census Bureau. Placed on top 
of the decline already projected, this would bring the population growth rate to about 0.1 
percent per year from 2005 to 2030.  On the other hand, pushing taxes back down by a 
similar amount could raise the in-migration rate enough to boost the population growth 
rate closer to the US average rate and keep the state’s share of population and income 
from declining as much.  Accounting for out-migration would reinforce these effects on 
population growth.   
 
The recent increase in the tax rate is large. According to Tax Foundation data, Indiana’s 
state and local tax burden rose from 35th in the nation in 2000 to 25th in 2005. In 2000, 
Indiana had a lower tax rate than all of its neighbors.  Since then, all of these states had 
rising tax rates, but Indiana’s tax rate increase was sufficiently large to put it above the 
rate in Kentucky. Ohio had the highest tax rate of neighboring states in 2005; at 11.8 
percent, 0.8 percentage points higher than in 2000. Ohio’s tax rate put the state at the 10th 
highest level in the nation.  Ohio’s in-migration rate was only 1.6 percent in 2005, below 
Indiana’s 2.1 percent and lower than the rate in all states except New York, California, 
and Michigan, which tied for the lowest in-migration rate in the country at 1.3 per 
thousand.. All three are high-tax states, especially New York where the tax rate was 
highest in 2005 at 14 percent.     
 
The Tax Foundation also prepares a State Business Tax Index, which assesses the 
attractiveness of a state based on its tax system.4 Their index is based on five 
subcomponents of the tax system: individual income taxes, corporate income taxes, sales 
taxes, unemployment insurance taxes and property taxes.  Somewhat ironically, their 
index shows Indiana as a very attractive state.  How can a state have the 25th highest 
taxes in the land and yet have the 12th best tax climate?6   The answer is that the Tax 
Foundation ranks low individual income taxes with an especially large weight compared 
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with other taxes and Indiana has one of the lowest individual tax rates in the country, 
ranking eleventh lowest.5  
 
Indiana relies more heavily on corporate income taxes and property taxes than other 
states and, while sales taxes are relatively low, these tax rates have increased most rapidly 
since 2000. It is arguable whether a given tax burden arising from an income tax is 
substantially less onerous than one arising from taxes on corporate capital income or 
property taxes, but this is not reflected in the Tax Foundation’s State Business Climate 
Index. Even the climate index shows deterioration, however.  In the first two estimates of 
the index for 2003 and 2004, Indiana ranked 10th in the country. Some of the 
deterioration, at least judged by the climb in the tax rate, occurred between 2000 and 
2003.6  
 
The Tax Foundation’s State Business Climate Index suggests that more bang would come 
from cutting the individual income tax than other taxes. A lower income tax rate directly 
affects take-home pay and may be more transparent than assessing other taxes for an 
interstate move. On the other hand, the taxes that have risen most in recent years have 
been sales and property taxes. Indiana is already relatively lower on the income tax 
ranking. The important point is that cutting taxes of any type will attract more people to 
Indiana and please existing residents; it also does not expand government programs.   
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Lower state and local tax rates can boost population growth
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Chart 2 shows the effects of the Indiana state and local tax rate on population growth as 
tax rates are varied from 8 percent, the 2005 low rate in New Hampshire, to 14 percent, 
the 2005 maximum rate in New York around the 2005 point for Indiana, where the tax 
rate was 10.6 percent and the population growth rate was about 0.7 percent.  Raising the 
tax rate further, to 12.3 percent would bring population growth to a halt or raising it to 
New York’s level would bring on a rte of population decline in Indiana of -0.7 percent.  
Conversely, lowering the overall rate to 10 percent could bring the population growth rate 
up to 0.9 percent, higher than the US Census Department estimate for the 2005-30 
population growth rate.  Matching New Hampshire’s 8 percent rate could boost 
population growth to 1.8 percent, more than twice the prospective national rate.  These 
estimates account for only the effects of the tax rate on in-migration and do not include 
the reinforcing effects on out-migration.    
 
 
 
*Tatom is Director of Research at Networks Financial Institute in Indianapolis, part of 
Indiana State University, where he is also Associate Professor of Finance. Earlier he was 
Head of Country Risk and Limit Control at UBS in Zurich.  He is also a former policy 
adviser and research official at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
 
 
Endnotes 
1. See U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, Interim State Population Projections, 
2005.  
 
2. The tax rate data are from Dubay(2007).  
 
3. The elasticity of the in-migration rate with respect to the tax rate is -1.39, which means 
that a doubling of the tax rate will cut the in-migration rate by more than one-half.  When 
past employment growth and per capita income are included in this estimate, the 
elasticity drops to -0.95 (t-ratio equals -3.48), which is still quite large and highly 
significant.  
   
4. See Dubay and Atkins (2006) for a description of the index and its latest rankings.   
     
5. In addition, there are other features of the tax system that are ranked; indeed, there are 
113 variables that factor in to the five subcomponents of the tax climate index. 
 
6. The Cato Institute assigned a “D” to the Indiana Governor’s tax policy in 2006 based 
on proposals, and the capping of property tax relief.  They failed to point out the rise in 
local sales taxes in several counties, although this may not be properly attributed to the 
Governor. See Slivinski (2006).  Local income taxes approved in the latest and previous 
legislative sessions and property tax increases and other new taxes, will sharply raise tax 
rates in this and coming years, well beyond items currently in the Tax foundation 
estimates.   
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